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There is no doubt that Kentucky is a coal mining state. It is equally
true that the ravages of strip-mining for coal are well-known to
Kentuckians. In 1988, the people of Kentucky responded to a long-felt
injustice in the common law which permitted coal mining outfits to
strip-mine property pursuant to ancient "broad form deeds."' The
people of Kentucky enacted a constitutional amendment designed to
prohibit such mining without the surface owner's express consent. The
Amendment is now set forth in Section 19(2) of the Kentucky Constitu-
tion and is commonly referred to as the Broad Form Deed Amendment.
"The phrase 'broad form deed' is a loosely-defined term applied to
certain deeds severing the mineral estate from the surface. The broad
form deed is, as its name suggests, a mere form."2
I. A HIsTORY OF THE BROAD FORM DEED AMENDMENT
The Broad Form Deed Amendment was precipitated by a long
history of strip-mining that had been carried out pursuant to mineral
rights conveyances embodied in the broad form deed. The origin of the
bitter broad form deed controversy dates back to the turn of the century
Associate Editor, KENTucKy LAw JOURNAL. J.D. 1997, University of Kentucky; B.S.
1986, University of Kentucky. The author wishes express his gratitude to his wife, Holly, and
children, David, Katherine, and John for their encouragement in writing this article.
Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956), overruled by Ward v. Harding, 860
S.W.2d 283 (Ky. 1993).
2 Robert M. Pfieffer, Kentucky's New Broad Form Deed Law-Is It Constitutional?, I J.
MIN. L. & POL'Y 57, 58 (1985-86).
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and begins with a young amateur geologist named John C. C. Mayo.
An excerpt from an article by Robert Pfiefer explains:
The history of these broad form deeds is, to a large extent,
the story of one man, John C. C. Mayo, who was born in 1864
to a poor Pike County farming family but became the richest
and most powerful coal baron of his time. At a time when a
college education was practically unheard of in Kentucky's hill
country, Mayo managed to attend Kentucky Wesleyan College
at Millersburg. There, Mayo studied geology and learned for
the first time of eastern Kentucky's wealth of mineral re-
sources. After graduation, Mayo formed a trading company for
the purpose of acquiring minerals. With $450 in capital, Mayo
began a process of acquisition that would ultimately entitle him
to hundreds of thousands of acres of minerals in Eastern
Kentucky.
Mayo rarely bought land outright, preferring instead to
acquire just the minerals, using broad form deeds that he
prepared.3
Around the turn of the century, Mayo traveled a ten county area in
Eastern Kentucky.4 He traveled from county to county, searching the
deed books in each county courthouse to determine owners of land that
he considered a good risk. After his deed book search, he would offer
the "lucky" owner between fifty cents and six dollars per acre for the
mineral rights.' The sellers were usually eager to convey their mineral
rights to Mayo. "They signed their names (or, in most instances, affixed
their marks) and prayed that Mayo could raise the purchase money
within the time specified."6
Though the memory of the Mayo name has nearly been extin-
guished with the passage of the years, at one time the name John Mayo
was virtually a household word in Eastern Kentucky. People living
during the Mayo heyday considered him a hero and even talked of
having Mayo run for Governor.7 Mayo's exploits, generosity, and
Id. at 61.
William Keesler, 2 Leslie Natives Callfor Investigation of Alleged Fraudulent Broad-
Form Deeds, LOUISVILLE COURIER-J., October 29, 1988, at A7.
See Pfieffer, supra note 2, at 61 n.14.
6 Id.
' HARRY M. CAUDILL, THEIRS BE THE POWER: THE MOGULS OF EASTERN KENTUCKY 65
(1983).
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eccentricity made him a natural focus of attention.8 Interestingly, when
Mayo experienced his untimely death at the age of forty-nine, he was
considered the richest man in Kentucky, having a net wealth of twenty
million dollars.9
The Mayo broad form deed was all encompassing, or "broad,"
conveying to Mayo all the necessary rights that could be imagined in
that day."0 As the Kentucky Supreme Court observed:
Typically Mayo deeds and others of their genre conveyed all
minerals which underlay the surface, granted rights to use the
surface to such an extent as was necessary or convenient to
gain access to the minerals, contained an express waiver of
liability for damages to the surface, and reserved to the surface
owner only such rights as were consistent with the other
provisions of the instrument."
The critical language of the broad form deed was that portion which
gave the mineral owner the right to use the surface as was "necessary or
convenient"' 2 for accessing the coal. This language was interpreted in
1956 in the seminal case of Buchanan v. Watson 3 as allowing the
mineral owner to strip-mine in order to recover the coal.'4 As expected,
surface owners in this era were outraged, now that the "obliteration of
the surface"' 5 was judicially sanctioned.
In 1984 the Kentucky General Assembly responded to this
perceived injustice to surface owners by enacting the statutory predeces-
sor to the Broad Form Deed Amendment, sections 381.930 to 381.945
Id. Caudill recounts that Mayo's
generosity was legendary because after the conclusion of a successful
trade he generally handed the worn, weary wife a five-dollar gold piece
as an "outright gift." Often the only money the woman ever possessed,
the coins were sometimes preserved for half a century, and shown
proudly to heirs and visitors as "my John Mayo money."
Id. On another occasion, Mayo offered a landowner $1,000 in cash if he would merely listen to his
offer for ten minutes. Id. at 69.
Id. at 84.
'0 For an example of the typical Mayo broad form deed, see Watson v. Kenlick Coal Co.,
498 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1974).
" Ward v. Harding, 860 S.W.2d 280,282 (Ky. 1993) (emphasis added).
12 Id.
"J 290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956), overruled by Ward v. Harding, 860 S.W.2d 283 (Ky. 1993).
14 Id. at 42.
"s Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294, 306-307 (Ky. 1987).
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of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. 6 Section 381.940 was the heart of
the legislation. It provided that in deeds in which the mineral and
surface estates were severed, if the deed failed to
describe in express and specific terms the method of coal
extraction to be employed... [then]... it shall be held, in the
absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, that
the intention of the parties to the instrument was that the coal
be extracted only by the method or methods of commercial coal
extraction commonly known to be in use in Kentucky... at the
time the instrument was executed."' 7
The obvious intent of this statute was to preclude all strip-mining
under broad form deed conveyances, because strip-mining as it is
conducted in modem mining operations was unheard of in that era. The
Kentucky Supreme Court in Akers v. Baldwin" took judicial notice of
the fact that "the evidence generally iq that strip-mining, as is practiced
today, was non-existent in the early 1900s, when most, if not all of the
Broad Form deeds were executed."' 9 Hence, no strip-mining could be
done under the language of section 381.940 because it was, for all
practical purposes, statutorily impossible to prove that the parties to the
deed had intended to permit strip-mining.
However, the Akers court went on to find section 381.940°
unconstitutional as applied to broad form deeds.2 Specifically, the
court invalidated the statute for two reasons. First, the court declared
the statute "improper" because it was a "clear intrusion into the
judiciary power."" This "intrusion" into the province of the judiciary
was occasioned by the statute's language, which provided that "it shall
be held, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary," that the parties intended the coal to be mined by commercial
methods commonly known and in use at the date of the deed's execu-
tion.23 The court recognized that it was the responsibility of the
judiciary to interpret the parties' intent as manifested in the deed. As
16 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 381.930-945 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990).
1" Id. § 381.940. (emphasis added).
Is 736 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1987).
19 Id. at 308-09.
20 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 381.940.
2 Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294, 309 (Ky. 1984).
22 Id.
23 Id. at 308.
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such, the statute was violative of Sections 27, 28, and 109 of the
Kentucky Constitution, in which separation of powers requirements are
set forth.24
Second, the court also found section 381.940 unconstitutional
because it impaired the obligation of contracts, in violation of the
Contract Clause2 6 of the United States Constitution.?7 Dispositive in this
regard was that the statute "function[ed] retroactively to determine the
meaning of a preexisting deed." '2 In short, the "General Assembly
[could] specify prospectively what rights are granted or denied by the
use of certain language in contracts written in the fture, but they cannot
affect vested property rights.
29
With section 381.940 thus invalidated, the General Assembly and
voters quickly reacted by enacting section 19(2) of the State Constitu-
tion-the Broad Form Deed Amendment.3" "With ratification of Section
19(2) of the Constitution of Kentucky, the people swept away decades
of litigation and numerous court decisions addressing the proper
construction of the so-called 'broad form' deeds."3' As enacted, the
Amendment was virtually identical32 to K.R.S. § 381.940. The
Amendment was obviously enacted in order to circumvent the unconsti-
tutional legislative "intrusion" into the sphere of the judiciary, as was
expressed in the Akers" decision. However, the question of a federal
Contract Clause violation was not resolved.
In 1993, the Kentucky Supreme Court made its first analysis of the
then five-year old Broad Form Deed Amendment in Ward v. Harding.
34
In Ward, as expected, the parties clashed over the rights granted in one
of the Mayo genre broad form deeds. Specifically, the mineral owner
argued on the basis of the Akers decision that he had a right to use the
surface in any way "necessary or convenient" to recover the coal.'- The
24 Id. at 309.
21 KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 381.940.
26 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
2' Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294, 310 (Ky. 1984).
28 Id.
29 Id. (emphasis added).
o The Broad Form Deed Amendment was enacted in 1988, the year following the Akers
decision.
" Ward v. Harding, 860 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Ky. 1993) (footnote omitted).
'2 A detailed examination of the Amendment reveals that the only difference from the statute
is the transposition of the term "only" within the Amendment. The placement of the term does not
appear to effect any different meaning from the statute.
3 Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294,309 (Ky. 1987).
860 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1993).
" Id. at 282.
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surface owner, however, argued that the interpretation mandated by the
Broad Form Deed Amendment required an interpretation that strip-
mining was not intended by the parties to the original deed.36
The Supreme Court took an unexpected and novel position. It held
that no right to surface mine was envisioned by the parties to the
original conveyance. 7 In so deciding, the Court overruled nearly forty
years of precedent which had recognized that a right to strip mine was
envisioned in broad form deeds. 8 Thus, it was unnecessary for the
surface owner to resort to the interpretation mandated by the Broad
Form Deed Amendment. Moreover, because no right to surface mine
ever existed in the original conveyance, the Court held that there could
be no Contract Clause violation. The court reasoned that "[t]he
Contract Clause protects only those rights which are embraced in the
contract at the time it is entered into."39 Thus, because strip-mining
rights were not "embraced" in the contract, there could be no Contract
Clause violation.
With Ward thus decided, it seemed that the Broad Form Deed
Amendment was left a lifeless provision, relegated to the realm of the
legal historian. Though the Amendment may be mortally wounded, it
is not yet deceased. The ambiguities within the language of the
Amendment have made the Broad Form Deed Amendment an arrow in
the mineral litigator's bow. Most importantly, what did the enactors
mean when they provided that a broad form deed was to be construed
such that the parties only intended coal to be removed by the "method
or methods" of commercial extraction commonly in use in Kentucky
at the time the conveyance was executed? How narrowly did the
enactors intend that the term "method" be construed? Unfortunately, as
seems to be the general rule with respect to the drafting of constitutional
provisions, the General Assembly provided no definitional section to
explain the precise intent. This seeming ambiguity on the part of the
Amendment's drafters has been targeted by legal scholars as well as
"scorched earth" litigators in an effort to expand the scope of the
Amendment beyond the boundaries of strip-mining4' to longwall coal
mining.
316 Id. at 287.
37 Id.
a' Buchanan v. Watson, 290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956), overruled by Ward, 860 S.W.2d at 283.
' Ward, 860 S.W.2d at 288 (citations omitted).
4* Ky. CONST. § 19(2).
41 See infra notes 47-81 and accompanying text.
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Longwall mining is a mechanized. type of underground coal
extraction whereby coal is removed along a continuous face.42 There
are currently sixty-nine longwall mining operations in the United States,
five of which are located in Kentucky." These sixty-nine operations
produce a substantial amount of the total coal output in the United
States.' Any application of the Broad Form Deed Amendment to the
longwall mining clearly could have disastrous effects on the Kentucky
coal mining industry. Part II of this Article will examine the
prohibitional validity of the Broad Form Deed Amendment as it pertains
to types of mining other than strip-mining, and its application to
longwal 45 mining in particular. Part III will discuss some constitutional
ramifications of the Broad Form Deed Amendment if it is applied so as
to preclude longwall mining. The Article concludes that the Broad
Form Deed Amendment does not apply to preclude longwall mining; or,
if it is so applied, it is violative of the Contract Clause' of the United
States Constitution.
I. THE BROAD FORM DEED AMENDMENT WAS NOT INTENDED TO
PRECLUDE LONGWALL MINING
It is commonly, yet dangerously, assumed by many of those
familiar with Kentucky mineral law that the Broad Form Deed Amend-
ment prohibits only strip-mining under a broad form deed conveyance.
That the Amendment was intended to preclude strip-mining is accepted.
For example, the Lexington Herald-Leader newspaper, in a summary of
election issues and races in 1988 commented on the application of the
then-proposed constitutional Amendment. The Herald-Leader ex-
plained: "A 'yes' vote would stop coal operators from strip-mining land
covered by broad form deeds without specific permission of the surface
owner .... Underground mining of the land would not be affected by
the Amendment." '47 A number of similar articles" confirmed that such
42 Culp v. Consolidated Pa. Coal Co., 1989 WL 101553, at *8 (W.D. Pa. May 4, 1989).
,' Steve Fiscor, The 1997 Longwall Census, COAL AGE, Feb. 1997, at 27.
In 1995, the 72 longwall mining operations in existence at that time contributed over 50
percent of the total coal output in the United States. Erika Hobbs, Coal Age Returns for the
Millennium, COAL AGE, Sept. 1996, at 40.
" See infra text accompanying notes 62-67.
46 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. I.
.7 What Amendments on Ballot Mean, LEXINGTON HERALD LEADER, Final Edition, Nov. 8,
1988, at A8.
" See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
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was the intent of both voters and legislators-the two groups needed to
enact a constitutional amendment.
The "method or methods" language of the Amendment itself is not
intuitively limited to surface mining. Legal scholars such as Professor
Carolyn Bratt of the University of Kentucky College of Law and
mineral law attorney Karen Greenwel 49 have concluded that the Broad
Form Deed Amendment's "method or methods" language works so as
to preclude other modem forms of mining from being utilized under a
broad form conveyance. Moreover, they have both specifically
concluded that the Amendment prohibits the use of longwall mining
techniques, in addition to the strip-mining method.5" This position has
also been argued in a civil action now pending before the Kentucky
Court of Appeals.5
Such a prospect is nothing short of terrifying to mining companies
that use, or intend to use, longwall mining on property originally
conveyed pursuant to a broad form deed. Their ominous outlook
includes wasting millions of dollars" on preparing a longwall mining
operation that cannot be implemented, or shutting down mining
operations already in progress. Moreover, where it is mechanically
impossible or economically infeasible to mine using techniques other
than longwall, the mining company is stuck holding mineral rights that
are essentially worthless. A mining outfit faced with such a dilemma
has two alternatives--either shut down the entire operation, or repur-
chase from the surface owner the right to longwall mine. The surface
owner would then be able to rebargain with the mining company-but
this time solely for the right to longwall mine. His profit stands to run
into millions of dollars in many cases. Understandably, neither
alternative available to the mining outfit is attractive or economically
feasible.
" Ms. Greenwell is a partner in the law firm of Wyatt, Tarrant and Combs in Lexington,
Kentucky. For an example of another scholar who has concluded that the language precludes other
modem forms of mining, see Michelle A. Wenzel, The Modern Surface Use and Mineral
Development Accommodation Act: Easy Easements for Mining Interests, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 607,
643 (1993).
so Carolyn Bratt & Karen Greenwell, Broad Form Deed Amendment: Constitutional
Considerations, 5 J. Mni. L. & POL'Y 9, 10 n3 (1989-90). Bratt and Greenwell also conclude that
Kentucky's broad form Amendment is unconstitutional, deeming it to violate both the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause and the Contract Clause of Article I of the U.S. Constitution.
"' Karst-Robbins Coal Co. v. Arch of Kentucky, Inc. (No. 95-CA-3445 and No. 95-CA-
3446); See Kentucky Jury Upholds Longwall Rights, (21 No. 27) COAL WEEK 3 (1995).
" A longwall mining machine costs approximately $20 million. Kirsten Hankebo, Small
Coal Mines Are Finding Profits Elusive, LOUISVILLE COURIER-J., June 16, 1996, at OE.
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The Broad Form Deed Amendment, when properly understood and
analyzed, compels a conclusion that the Amendment puts no restrictions
whatsoever on longwall mining. To reach this conclusion, it is
necessary to determine what the enactors of the Broad Form Deed
Amendment meant where they provided that mining was only to be
conducted by the "method or methods" of coal extraction commonly in
use in Kentucky at the date of the deed's execution, unless there is clear
and convincing evidence that the parties intended the contrary. 3 In
short, what does "method" mean?54
The surface owner, who has a vested interest in the outcome, will
surely argue that longwall mining is a "method" of mining for purposes
of the Amendment. If this interpretation were to prevail, then a mineral
owner who is unable to recover coal by methods in existence at the date
of the deed's execution would have to either leave the coal unmined or
purchase from the surface owner a right to longwall mine. Such an
interpretation has been adopted by a number of legal experts.55
Although this pro surface owner position seems to have merit upon
a facial examination of the Broad Form Deed Amendment, just the
opposite result should be reached upon detailed analysis of the
Amendment and the terms of a broad form conveyance.
The enactors of the Broad Form Deed Amendment provided no
specific guidance-such as a definitional section-to precisely define
"method" as used in the Amendment. In such a case, the court's role in
interpreting any contested term in a provision of the Constitution is to
give effect to the intent of the framers of the instrument and of the
people adopting it." 6 In this process, the court must
look to the history of the times and the state of existing things
to ascertain the intention of the framers of the Constitution and
the people adopting it, [and give a] practical interpretation..
. to the end that the plainly manifested purpose of those who
created the Constitution or its amendments, may be carried
out.57
KY. CONST. § 19(2).
The foregoing reasoning regarding the enactors' intent originated and was aggressively
argued at the trial court level in the initial Kentucky decision interpreting the elusive term
"method." Karst-Robbins Coal Co. v. Arch of Kentucky, Inc. (No. 87-C 1-628).
" See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
" Grantz v. Grauman, 302 S.W.2d 364, 367 (Ky. 1957).
17 Keck v. Manning, 231 S.W.2d 604, 607 (Ky. 1950).
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The intent of the Amendment's enactors is apparent upon an examina-
tion of the "history of the times" in which the Amendment was enacted.
This intent is revealed in the Amendment's statutory predecessor,
sections 381.930-.945 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, as well as the
newspaper accounts of the day.
The most apparent evidence of how the voters and legislators
intended to define "method" is revealed in section 381.935 of the
Kentucky Revised Statutes,18 the definitional provision of the statutory
predecessor of the Broad Form Deed Amendment. Section 381.935
provides: "For the purposes of K.R.S. § 381.940, 'method' or
'methods' mean underground, surface, auger, or open pit mining and
nothing in K.R.S. § 381.940 shall be interpreted to adversely affect the
use of modem equipment or machinery with respect to mining methods
permitted under KRS § 381.940.""9 In layman's parlance, this statute
provides that there are two "methods" of mining for purposes of the
K.R.S. § 381.940. The first method is strip, as denoted by the terms
"surface," "auger," or "open pit," which are simply categories of strip-
mining.' The second method is "underground." Therefore, longwall
mining can only be categorized for purposes of the Amendment as
either "underground" or "strip." Underground mining was well-known
in Mayo's era, while strip-mining was not.
61
Although the legislature failed to provide a definition of "under-
ground" mining, an examination of longwall mining and traditional
means of underground mining reveals little difference between the two,
with the exception of the type of equipment used.
Underground mining traditionally has been carried out by the room-
and-pillar system of coal removal. Using this system, large blocks of
coal in a given seam would be removed manually-in the era of the
broad form conveyances, using shovel and mule. Coal pillars then
would be left intact at regular intervals within the seam in order to
support the overlying strata. At a later point in the mining process, it
was common to remove or "pull" as much of the pillars as was feasible
without causing immediate collapse of the above strata.62 Often, the
58 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.935 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990).
'9 /d.
'o Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294, 296 n.3 (Ky. 1987).
61 Readers Discuss Pros and Cons of Broad Form Deed Vote Campaign, LOUISVILLE
COURIER-J., Oct. 22, 1988, at 14A.
62 J. Thomas Lane, Fire in the Hole to Longwall Shears: Old Law Applied to New
Technology and other Longwall Mining Issues, 96 W. VA. L. REv. 577, 588 (1994); Patrick C.
McGinley, Does the Right to Mine Coal under Lease or Deed include the Right to Extract by
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above strata would collapse over a period of 50-100 years in a process
known as subsidence.63 The purpose of this later recovery of coal was
to maximize the mine's profitability. Importantly, such mining
practices have been used in Kentucky for more than a century, and have
often been the subject of litigation, including during the era in which the
Mayo deeds were executed.'
Longwall mining involves a similar process. Longwall mining is
conducted using a mechanized device commonly referred to as a
longwall miner. The longwall miner uses a steel plow or rotating drum,
which is pulled mechanically across the face of an underground seam of
coal, while allowing the overlying strata to collapse behind it.65 In
short, both room and pillar (when pillars are "pulled") and longwall
mining result in an underground seam of coal being removed with
concomitant subsidence of the overlaying strata." The only significant
differences between the two techniques are the equipment used to mine
the underground seam and the timing of the subsidence. "A most
obvious point is that where underground mining of coal was contem-
plated, longwall mining as a technique of underground mining is
permissible."67 The final result of both techniques is substantially the
same-an underground seam of coal is removed. The logical conclu-
sion is that longwall mining is merely a modem technique for conduct-
ing underground mining-and thus it does not constitute a separate
"method" of mining for the purposes of the Broad Form Deed Amend-
ment. Such reasoning is consistent with the General Assembly's
requirement in the definitional section of the statute that nothing "shall
be interpreted to adversely affect the use of modem equipment or
machinery with respect to mining methods permitted."6
Longwall Mining Methods?, 5 EASTERN MIN. L. FOUND. § 5.02(4) (1984).
63 McGinley, supra note 62, at § 5.03.
'4 North-East Coal Co. v. Hayes, 51 S.W.2d 960 (Ky. 1932) (holding that the surface
owner's right to have surface maintained free from subsidence was absolute); Jones Coal Co. v.
Mays, 8 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. 1928) (holding that surface owner must be left sufficient support to
maintain surface in its natural state); West Ky. Coal Co. v. Dilbak, 294 S.W. 478 (Ky. 1927)
(holding surface owners right to freedom from subsidence absolute); Nisbet v. Lofton, 277 S.W.
828 (Ky. 1925) (detailing removal of pillars and resulting subsidence.).
65 McGinley, supra note 62, at § 5.02(3).
Culp v. Consolidated Pa. Coal Co., 1989 WL 101553, *8 (W.D. Pa. May 4, 1989); see
also Robert L. Shuman, Note, Subsequent Support: A Right Afforded to Surface Estates Alone?,
97 W. VA. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (1995) (noting that "mine-related subsistence is not peculiar to
longwall operations, as opposed to more traditional room and pillar operations.").
67 McGinley, supra note 62, at § 5.04(4).
6' KY. Rav. STAr. ANN. § 381.935 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990).
1996-97]
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL L.
Two arguments contrary to this conclusion exist for the surface
owner. The first is that the definition of "method" in section 381.935
cannot be used to interpret the Broad Form Deed Amendment because
the statute is unconstitutional. This argument would urge that because
section 381.940 was held to be unconstitutional in the Akers69 decision,
by implication its definitional section must also be unconstitutional.
The second argument is that the statute is simply inapplicable because
it was not incorporated in the Broad Form Deed Amendment. Although
it is arguable that K.R.S. 381.935 was invalidated by implication in
Akers, this invalidation is at the most partial. Moreover, any such
invalidation is immaterial because the statute's possible unconstitution-
ality does not detract from its usefulness in demonstrating how the
enactors of the Broad Form Deed Amendment intended to define
"method."
A straightforward reading of the -Akers and Ward'° decisions
reveals that K.R.S. 381.940 is unconstitutional, but only in part. In
1987, the Kentucky Supreme Court declared section 381.940 unconsti-
tutional to the extent that it affected past transactions.7 That is, the
court only declared the statute unconstitutional in part, rather than
finding it invalid in its entirety. The Court first noted that "[t]he
legislation, as a whole, applies to all written instruments, past, present
and future,"2 and then that "[t]he General Assembly can specify
prospectively what rights are granted or denied by use of certain
language in contracts written in the future, but they cannot affect vested
property rights . . . [W]e only declare that part of the legislation
unconstitutional which-by virtue of the presumption created-affects
past transactions."73
Section 381.940 purports to govern both past and future transac-
tions, as is evident from the plain language of the statute: "[i]n any
instrument heretofore or hereinafter executed."74 Therefore, according
to Akers, the section is valid and constitutional in part, that is, as far as
it pertains to future transactions from the date of its enactment. This
partial invalidation was confirmed six years after Akers by the Kentucky
Supreme Court in Ward when it stated, "In Akers, this Court's plurality
6, 736 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1987).
70 Id. at 310.
71 Id.
71 Id. at 308 (emphasis added).
" Id. at 310.
7' KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.940 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990).
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opinion invalidated aportion of K.R.S. § 381.940." 71 Therefore, K.R.S.
§ 381.935 is still valid for the purpose of defining the constitutionally
valid remnant of K.R.S. § 381.940.
The surface owner's second line of argument is that the definition
of "method" as provided in K.R.S. § 381.935 is inapplicable because
it was not incorporated explicitly into the Broad Form Deed Amend-
ment. If the Amendment's enactors wanted to use the same definition
of "method," then why did they fail to incorporate the definitional
section into the Amendment, especially in light of the fact that the
statute was enacted just four years earlier?
This question is probably best answered by noting that definitional
sections are rarely, if ever, used in constitutions. Thus, it is not
surprising that the Broad Form Deed Amendment had no definitional
section. Moreover, it seems apparent that at the time the Amendment
was adopted, the recognized understanding of "method" meant either
strip or underground mining.76 Nevertheless, the Kentucky Supreme
Court, in interpreting an ambiguous term in the Constitution, must
follow the principle which requires that such terms be interpreted so as
to give effect to the intent of the framers and adopters.77 As previously
noted, the court should "look to the history of the times and the state of
existing things" in order to determine the intent of the Amendment's
enactors."I Additionally, the court should consider the "prior state of the
law and the evil to be remedied" in interpreting an unclear phrase or
term in the Constitution.79
In line with the aforementioned precedent, a court's duty in
constitutional interpretation is, first and foremost, to carry out the
intention of the enactors of the constitutional provision. K.R.S. §
381.935 is significant evidence of the "history of the times" as well as
the "prior state of the law" that the court has a mandate to consider in
its interpretational decision. Moreover, Kentucky courts have recog-
nized that such reference to a prior enacted statute is appropriate "for the
purpose of resolving an ambiguity.""0 In light of the foregoing
precedent, Kentucky courts are not limited to a "four comers" examina-
tion in divining the enactors' intent, but rather are required to examine
" Ward v. Harding, 860 S.W.2d 280, 283 (Ky. 1993) (emphasis added).
76 See supra text accompanying notes 58-68.
" State Journal Co. v. Commonwealth, 160 S.W.2d 145, 147-48 (Ky. 1942).
" Keck v. Manning, 231 S.W.2d 604, 607 (Ky. 1950).
Gardner v. Ray, 157 S.W. 1147, 1152 (Ky. 1913).
o Thiemann v. Hancock, 176 S.W.2d 418, 419 (Ky. 1943).
1996-97]
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL L.
a variety of matters to determine the question of intent. Consistent with
this clearly established precedent, K.R.S. § 381.935 demonstrates that
the enactors desired the term "method" to mean "underground, surface,
auger, or open pit mining."8' Consequently, because longwall mining
is a type of underground mining that produces subsidence, and
underground mining with subsidence was bargained for in Mayo's era,82
the Broad Form Deed Amendment does not preclude longwall mining.
In addition to the evidence of intent as to the definition of "method"
seen in K.R.S. § 381.935, a number of newspaper articles dealt with the
Broad Form Deed Amendment just prior to its enactment. Virtually all
of these articles demonstrated that the voters enacting the Amendment
understood that the Amendment would only preclude strip-mining. For
example, the Louisville Courier Journal noted: "The Amendment calls
for requiring the holders of mineral rights under broad form-deeds to
obtain the permission of the surface owner before strip-mining."8' 3
Furthermore, the newspaper observed that the Broad Form Deed
Amendment "is designed to keep mineral owners from strip-mining coal
without landowner's consent.""
In conclusion, it seems clear that the Broad Form Deed Amendment
is simply inapplicable to prohibit the use of longwall underground
mining pursuant to a Mayo broad form conveyance, because the
enactors of the Amendment never intended such a result.
III. THE BROAD FORM DEED AMENDMENT, IF APPLIED To PROHIBIT
LONGWALL MINING UNDER A BROAD FORM DEED,
WOULD VIOLATE THE CONTRACT CLAUSE8 S
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Perhaps the most interesting element in the broad form deed saga
is an examination of the Amendment's validity in light of the United
States Constitution. The Amendment's constitutionality was first
" Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 381.935 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990).
52 A typical Mayo-era broad form deed gave the mineral purchaser "the right to remove all
pillars and other lateral and other subjacent supports without leaving pillars to support the roof or
surface." Watson v. Kenlick Coal Co., 498 F.2d 1183, 1186 (6th Cir. 1974). The deed referenced
in Watson was executed in 1905 in Magoffin County, Kentucky. Id. at 1184-5.
" William Keesler, Deed Proposal Approved by Huge Margin, LOuiSVILLE COURIER-J.,
Nov. 9, 1988, at IA.
" Coal Firms Fail to Force Deed Issue off Ballot, LOUISVILLE COURIER-J., Oct. 29, 1988,
at 8A.
8' U.S. CONST. art. I., § 10, cl. 1.
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challenged in the pivotal decision of Ward v. Harding.86 As the reader
may recall from introductory Part 1,81 the Broad Form Deed Amendment
withstood both a Contract Clause" and a Takings Clause 9 challenge in
Ward.9 The court arrived at this decision by taking an unexpected path.
The court reached across nearly forty years of broad form deed
jurisprudence and held that there was no constitutional violation because
the right to strip-mine was never a right envisioned by the original
contracting parties.9 Though the right to strip-mine under a broad form
deed was consistently recognized from the initial case of Buchanan v.
Watson92 in 1956, and confirmed even up until the Akers decision in
1987, the Supreme Court in Ward overruled Buchanan and Akers,
93
concluding that "the right to strip mine was not a right properly flowing
from the original conveyance." '9 The court then recognized that no
constitutional violations could exist because no right to strip-mine ever
existed in the first place. Instead, "this right, such as it was, arose by
court decision half a century after the conveyance." '
The majority opinion was overshadowed by a scathing dissent96
from Justice Liebson, which was joined by Chief Justice Stephens and
Justice Vance, who believed that the "court bowed to the will of the
majority"'97 by holding that no surface mining rights properly flowed
from the conveyance. Justice Leibson suggested that the Majority
recognized that if the Broad Form Deed Amendment were applied to
preclude strip-mining under a broad form conveyance, then constitu-
tional violations would clearly exist.9" Therefore, he suggested, the
majority "circumvent[ed]" this "obvious dilemma" by declaring that
"Broad Form Deeds give no surface mining rights to the mineral owners
in the first place."99
As interesting as the Ward decision may be, it has little relevance
to longwall mining conducted pursuant to a broad form conveyance.
'6 860 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1993).
'T See supra text accompanying notes 31-39.
'8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, c1. I.
'9 U.S. CONST., amend. V.
-o Ward, 860 S.W.2d at 289.
91 Id.
92 290 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1956).
93 Ward, 860 S.W.2d at 287.
4 Id. at 288.
95 Id.
Id. at 289 (Liebson, J. dissenting).
I7 d. at 295.
" Id. at 294-95.
Ward, 860 S.W.2d at 295 (Liebson, J., dissenting)..
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This is because the rights the mineral owner received by deed to conduct
underground mining are not rights arising "by court decision half a
century after the conveyance,"' 0 but rather are rights expressly
envisioned in the governing instrument. Thus, if those rights were to be
removed by the interpretational mandate of the Broad Form Deed
Amendment, it is clear that federal constitutional violations would
exist.' 01
Though the Ward court interpreted the enigmatic "necessary or
convenient" language of the broad form deed in question as not
envisioning surface mining,'02 the Mayo deeds went on to grant specific
rights to carry out underground mining. These deeds often waived the
right to subjacent support, allowing the mineral owner to remove coal
pillars and cause subsidence of the overlying strata.'0 3 This type of
subsidence is caused by both traditional underground mining and
longwall mining; ° thus, it stands to reason that a mining outfit in
possession of such a broad form deed can conduct longwall mining
because the results of such mining efforts were explicitly foreseen in the
deed.
This particular issue has been decided consistently with the
previous discussion on a number of occasions in other jurisdictions.10 '
For example, in Ball v. Island Creek Coal Co.' a federal district court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment by applying
1907 and 1908 subsidence waivers in Mayo type deeds to the effects of
longwall mining. The waivers in both deeds specifically provided that
the mineral owners would not be liable for failing to leave "any support
for the overlying strata."'0 7 Although the plaintiffs in Ball sought to
analogize their case to decisions precluding strip-mining, the court
reasoned:
10 Id. at 288.
"' This reasoning was first recognized and argued by the mineral owner in the broad form
deed case that is currently pending before the Kentucky Courts. See supra note 54 and
accompanying text.
102 Ward, 860 S.W.2d at 288.
'0 Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294,314 (Ky. 1984) (Stephenson, J. dissenting).
104 See infra text accompanying notes 58-68.
00 For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Judy J. Lewis, Severance Deeds Waivers of
the Surface Estate's Right Subjacent Support as a Basis for Longwall Mining, 6 J. MIN. L. & POL'Y
309(1991).
'06 722 F. Supp. 1370 (W.D. Va. 1989).
017 Id. at 1372.
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Modem longwall mining is different from the underground
mining techniques available when the severance deeds were
executed in the degree of damage, and not the kind of damage,
it causes to the surface. Thus, neither the use of modem
longwall mining nor the use of any other underground mining
technique requires the existence of the right to destroy the
surface as the use of strip-mining does. Therefore, whether the
parties to a deed contemplating the use of underground mining
contemplated the use of a particular underground mining
technique is irrelevant in regards to the permissibility of the use
of that technique.
' ' * The plaintiffs cannot reasonably contend that the
defendant should mine using picks and shovels to excavate the
coal and donkeys and mules to transport the coal as was the
custom of the time the deeds were executed.... An owner of
mineral lights should be allowed to take advantage of modem
technology subject to the terms of the deed.
The court determines that where a deed clearly waives the
surface owner's right to subjacent support in regard to
underground coal mining, Virginia law would allow the use of
longwall mining or any other underground mining technique.
108
In fact, with one exception, 'I all decisions dealing strictly with the
issue of whether longwall mining was envisioned under a broad form
conveyance hold favor of the mineral owner." 0
The principle behind the Ward decision is inapplicable to the issue
of longwall mining under a broad form deed. The Ward decision dealt
with the destruction of the Earth's surface caused by strip-mining. This
type of damage was unheard of in the era of the Mayo conveyances.
However, the type of damage resulting from longwall mining is
precisely the type of damage contemplated within the classic broad form
deed-the collapse of the overlying surface. As the federal district court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania noted, any attempt to preclude
Io ld. at 1373-74.
'o Phillips v. Old Ben Coal Co., 1991 WL 4720 (I11. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 1991), vacated and
appeal dismissed, April 1, 1991.
.. See Vandyke v. Island Creek Coal Co., 1991 WL 244692 (4th Cir. 1991); Smerdell v.
Consolidation Coal Co., 806 F. Supp. 1278 (N.D. W. Va. 1992); Culp v. Consolidated Pa. Coal
Co., 1989 WL 101553 (W.D. Pa. 1989); and Wells v. American Elec. Power Co., 548 N.E.2d 995
(Ohio Ct. App. 1988).
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longwall mining based on the reasoning of strip-mining cases "ignores
the obvious fundamental differences between longwall as a form of full
extraction deep mining, and strip-mining.""' Therefore, if such right as
granted in the broad form deed were to be eradicated by constitutional
edict, it is apparent that federal constitutional violations would exist. As
Professor Bratt and Ms. Greenwell noted: "The Amendment is a thinly
disguised attempt to readjust property rights in favor of the surface
owner and against the mineral estate owner by mandating the reinterpre-
tation of contracts made almost one hundred years ago. Such a law
raises a number of federal constitutional considerations.""12
Robert Pfeiffer was one of the first legal scholars over a decade ago
to suggest that a federal Contract Clause violation might be caused by
the original predecessor to the Broad Form Deed Amendment, House
Bill 32.213 He was not the last. The Contract Clause of the United
States Constitution provides that "[n]o State shall ... pass any... Law
impairing the Obligations of Contracts."" 4 An analysis of the applica-
tion of the Contract Clause to a particular set of circumstances requires
a three step determination. First, does the law in question "impair or
alter the rights and obligations of the parties" to the contract?"' Second,
if such an impairment or alteration exists, is it a "legitimate exercise of
the state's police power?""' 6 If the law is not a valid exercise of the
police power, it will "be struck as an impermissible impairment of
contracts violating the contract clause.""' 7 Third, if the law is a proper
exercise of police power, the Court will examine the impairment to
determine if the impairment is severe. If the impairment is not severe,
the Court will "defer to the legislature's determination that the means
they used and the conditions they imposed are reasonable and
necessary."' 8 If the impairment is severe, the Court will a conduct a
"non-deferential, virtually de novo review of the purposes, means, and
conditions of the legislation" to determine if the impairment is reason-
able."
9
Culp, 1989 WL 101553 at *9.
i1 Bratt & Greenwell, supra note 50, at 10-11.
" Pfeiffer, supra note 2, at 80.
'4 U.S. CONST, art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
" Bratt & Greenwell, supra note 50, at 66.
"' Id. at 67.
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Within the Contract Clause analytical framework, the first question
to be asked is "does the Broad Form Deed Amendment impair or alter
existing contractual rights?" The answer to this question is a resounding
"yes." The classic Mayo broad form deed conveyed to the mineral
owner "the right to remove all pillars and other lateral and subjacent
support"' in conjunction with a waiver of all damages. This provision
essentially granted the mineral owner the right to completely extract a
seam of coal, even though it would result in the subsidence of the
overlying surface. The Kentucky Supreme Court recently noted that
such language in the broad form deed "plainly indicate[d] ... that the
parties to these deeds contemplated deep mining." ''  Such a right in
broad form deeds also has been recognized in a number of other
jurisdictions.'22
The Broad Form Deed Amendment, if applied to impair the
aforementioned rights, would be an obvious impairment of contract. It
would, in a practical sense, work so as to erase an explicit contractual
right held by the mineral owner-the right to underground mine and
subside the overlying strata.
The second Contract Clause inquiry asks: Is such an impairment a
legitimate exercise of the police power? For a legitimate exercise of
police power to exist under the Contract Clause, the law "must address
a broad societal problem."'13 The Broad Form Deed Amendment fails
this second element of the Contract Clause analysis. Instead of
addressing a "broad societal problem," the Amendment serves no other
purpose than to adjust the economic rights of the surface and mineral
owner. The Amendment works so as to reconvey to the surface owner
one of the sticks in the mineral owner's bundle of rights-the right to
underground mine by withdrawing subjacent support with modem
equipment. The surface owner is now in the position to resell the right
to underground longwall mine. The Amendment does not stop longwall
mining and subsidence from being carried out. Rather, it merely
permits the surface owner to reap a windfall by selling such rights a
second time. Such a rearrangement of economic rights between
"0 Pfeiffer, supra note 2, at 60.
21 Ward v. Harding, 860 S.W.2d 280, 286 (Ky. 1993) (quoting Akers v. Baldwin, 736
S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1987) (Vance, J. concurring)).
12 See supra notes 102-112 and accompanying text.
zs Bratt & Greenwell, supra note 50, at 67.
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contracting parties already has been expressly rejected by the Kentucky
Supreme Court as not constituting a public purpose."
A case nearly analogous to the above discussion is the decision of
the Kentucky high court in Department for Nat. Resource. & Envtl.
Protection v. No. 8 Ltd.'25 In No. 8 Ltd., the Court considered a
challenge to Kentucky Revised Statutes § 350.060, which required a
mine operator intending to strip-mine to obtain a statement of consent
from the surface owner of the land to be strip-mined. 2 6 This statement
was required even though the mineral owner had the legal right to strip-
mine pursuant to his broad form deed. The high court held that such a
statute effected no public purpose, but rather, it did
no more than delegate to an individual, a privy of a party to the
contract which severed the mineral, a veto over the use of land
by the other party to the contract. It put the surface owner in
a position to be paid again for what he or his predecessor in
title has already received compensation.'27
Therefore, because the primary purpose of the statute was "to change
the relative legal rights and economic bargaining positions of many
parties under their contracts rather than achieve any public purpose"'28
it was found unconstitutional as a violation of the federal Contract
Clause. ' 2
Justice Liebson made a similar observation of the Broad Form Deed
Amendment in his dissent in Ward where he noted:
[The stated purposes of the Amendment] relate primarily (if
not entirely) to protecting private interests, those of the surface
owners. The preamble states seven purposes: six of the seven
cite narrow objectives related to the area of mineral titles and
land transfers obviously intend to correct perceived hardship
and injustice to the surface owners caused by our previous
judicial decisions, and only one of which bears even the pretext
of regulation in the public interest. The one exception states
24 Department for Nat. Resources & Envtl. Protection v. No. 8, Ltd., 528 S.W.2d 684 (Ky.
1975).
125 Id.
26 Id. at 685.
127 Id. at 686 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
128 Id. at 686-87.
"'* Id. at 687.
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that we must "promote the conservation and the full and
efficient use of all natural resources of the state, including the
land, the making of improvements to the land, the growth of
agriculture, the development of new industry and the general
economic well-being of the state and its people." There is no
inkling as to how this law will effect this purpose in any way.
The law does not regulate surface mining except to say mineral
owners must purchase permission to surface mine from the
surface owners before undertaking mining operations. Its
effect as a conservation measure is speculative at best, either
minimal or nonexistent depending on one's point of view. To
withstand constitutional review the primary purpose and effect
of the legislation must promote the general welfare as con-
trasted with a potentially remote or incidental effect. 3 '
Professor Carolyn Bratt reached this same conclusion. She noted
that the Amendment "permits individual surface owners to determine
whether or not they will permit the use of modem coal mining methods.
Any statute which permits individuals to accept or reject it can only
have been for the benefit of those few individuals who are given the
choice."''
Finally, where a law impairs a contractual obligation and does not
serve a valid public purpose, it is not necessary to continue to the third
element of the Contract Clause analysis. Rather, in such a case the
Contract Clause "become[s] absolute to prohibit any impairment of
contracts . .. [and] the Amendment would simply be struck as an
impermissible impairment of contracts violating the contract clause."'32
Such is the case of the Broad Form Deed Amendment if applied to
longwall mining.
CONCLUSION
The Broad Form Deed Amendment was wounded, though not
mortally, by the Kentucky Supreme Court's Ward decision in 1993.
The Ward Court held that the parties to a broad form deed did not
contemplate the right to strip-mine, and thus, it was now unnecessary to
"3 Ward v. Harding, 860 S.W.2d 280, 293 (Ky. 1993) (Liebson, J. dissenting) (first emphasis
added).
"' Bratt & Greenwell, supra note 50, at 68.
132 Id.
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resort to the Amendment's mandate in order to reach the conclusion that
broad form deeds do not permit strip-mining. With the right to strip-
mine thus interpreted out of the broad form deed, it would have
appeared that the Broad Form Deed Amendment no longer served any
purpose. However, the Amendment is thought by some legal scholars
and practitioners also to prohibit longwall mining pursuant to a broad
form conveyance. However, with all due respect to the aforementioned
experts, such a position is untenable.
First, when the Amendment's "method or methods" language is
viewed in light the "history of the times" in which it was enacted, it is
obvious that the voters and legislators who enacted the Amendment
only intended to define "method" to mean strip-mining and underground
mining. As is clear from the above text, longwall mining is merely the
use of modem equipment to conduct underground mining, and such
underground mining was contemplated within the explicit terms of the
broad form deed. Thus, longwall mining is not precluded by the Broad
Form Deed Amendment.
Second, even if the Broad Form Deed Amendment is considered to
prohibit the use of longwall mining under a broad form deed, then the
Amendment violates the Contract Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion. This violation exists because explicit and substantial contract and
property rights conveyed in the broad form deed are destroyed by an
Amendment which serves no public purpose. The purpose of the Broad
Form Deed Amendment is nothing more than the reallocation of
economic rights among private parties to a conveyance. A law which
impairs contractual rights and has no public purpose is facially
unconstitutional. Such is the Broad Form Deed Amendment as applied
to longwall mining.
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